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We explore how increased competition affects firms’ obfuscation strategies in a lab-
oratory experiment. Firms sell a base good and an add-on product. Besides choos-
ing the base-good price sellers take an action that mimicks the effects of shrouding
the add-on product. Shrouding is an equilibrium but an unshrouding equilibrium
coexists. In our experiment, more competition matters in that only duopolistic mar-
kets are frequently shrouded whereas four-firm markets are not. With repeated in-
teraction, shrouding rates do not increase. However, the opportunities to shroud
facilitate tacit collusion on the base-good price for the duopolies: the unshrouding
equilibrium serves as a credible punishment if deviations occur.
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I Introduction
For behavioral industrial organization, a key question is to what extent firms can exploit
consumer irrationalities. It is by now well accepted that consumer decision making is
far from perfect. Consumers make mistakes, may use simple (non-optimal) rules of
thumb (Ellison, 2006), and are subject to behavioral biases (DellaVigna, 2009). How
rational firms respond to those consumer behaviors is at the heart of recent behaviorally
founded theories in industrial economics (see Ellison, 2006; Spiegler, 2011).
A prime example of this kind of behavioral IO are obfuscation strategies which firms
may use to target myopic, inattentive consumers. Consumer myopia has been observed,
for example, in financial markets (e.g., Campbell, 2006; Choi et al., 2010), electricity
markets (Wilson and Waddams Price, 2010) and online auctions (Hossain and Morgan,
2006). In these examples, consumers do not choose optimally but myopically pick a sub-
optimal tariff or inefficient bid. The examples also show that firms may respond with
some obfuscation strategy. They may highlight irrelevant information (Choi et al., 2010),
develop redundant financial innovations (Henderson and Pearson, 2011), or shroud cer-
tain price elements (Campbell, 2006).
Whether firms’ attempts to exploit myopic consumers are successful is more difficult
to answer, not least since competition is a forceful argument suggesting this may not be
the case. In a pioneering and frequently cited paper, Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show,
however, that intensified competition might not have any bite. In a model with rational
(attentive) and myopic (inattentive) consumers, they show that the shrouding of add-on
information can be an equilibrium despite perfect price competition.
In this paper, we conduct a laboratory experiment to explore the effects of increased
competition on shrouding behavior. We consider a stylized version of Gabaix and Laib-
son (2006) where firms sell a base good and an add-on product. Firms decide on the
base-good price as well as on an action that mimicks the effects of shrouding the add-
on. This decision is a coordination decision where the add-on is shrouded to consumers
only if all firms decide to shroud. Otherwise, if at least one firm unshrouds, all con-
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sumers are perfectly informed about the add-on. We consider both a static game where
firms only interact once as well a dynamic game where firms repeatedly compete over
a finite number of periods. Both shrouding and unshrouding equilibria coexist in the
static game.
An experimental approach seems well suited for exploring this issue because theory
is often bland regarding the equilibrium multiplicity (the shrouding equilibrium exists
for any number of firms). We implement a stylized design with a focus on the firm side
and where the buyer side is computerized (see our literature survey below for experi-
ments analyzing the buyer side). We consider the following treatments. The degree of
competition is varied by changing the number of firms: we conduct experiments with
two and four sellers. A second treatment variable is the matching scheme: we have
markets with random and fixed matching to test the implications of the static as well as
of the repeated game. Repeated interaction itself may lead to improved coordination in
a shrouding equilibrium. Moreover, one of our main goals is to study how the shroud-
ing and the pricing decision affect one another. Therefore, we additionally examine two
treatments which study either the shrouding or the pricing decision in isolation. These
can be compared ceteris paribus to the treatments involving both decisions.
Despite the Gabaix and Laibson (2006) argument, we find that more competition is
detrimental toward the shrouding of add-on prices. A first channel for this to happen
is simply that coordination on a shrouding equilibrium is more difficult for four firms:
shrouding is the more risky choice and, all else equal, coordination on the shrouding
equilibrium is easier with fewer competitors. A second channel as to how increased
competition can be a force against shrouding strategies stems from an analysis of the
repeated game. In our setup, there exist tacitly collusive equilibria where firms raise
the base good price above the competitive level even with finitely many repetitions
(Benoit and Krishna, 1985; Friedman, 1985). Shrouding possibilities are worrisome in
the repeated game because it helps to sustain tacit collusion: unshrouding serves as a
simple but credible threat to sustaining cooperation regarding prices. Whether such
tacit collusion is feasible will again depend on the number of competitors. Indeed, we
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find that shrouding leads to higher base good prices where again, the effect is limited
to duopolies.
II Literature
Our paper is related to two streams of the literature. First, we complement the litera-
ture on behavioral industrial organization. Second, we contribute to a literature that
experimentally investigates spillovers between decisions.
Our paper adds to the growing literature on behavioral industrial organization the-
ory that studies firm behavior in the presence of behaviorally biased consumers, most
closely to papers that analyze firms’ incentives to shroud a price element or an add-on
from myopic, inattentive consumers.1 The seminal paper in the theoretical literature is,
as discussed above, the paper by Gabaix and Laibson (2006). In contrast to Gabaix and
Laibson (2006) we also consider a repeated game analysis which permits us to analyze
whether shrouded markets facilitate price collusion.
Buyer confusion and to what extent firms can exploit such confusion are topics that
are relatively new to the experimental literature. Kalayci and Potters (2011) study the
impact of confusion caused by firms (represented by participants in the laboratory) on
buyers (also represented by subjects). Sellers can confuse buyers by choosing a large
number of product attributes, but these attributes do not affect buyers’ valuations of
the good. They find that, all else equal, seller profits increase in the number of at-
tributes, and prices and profits are also higher than those in a benchmark treatment
with perfectly rational robot buyers. Kalayci (2015) presents experimental evidence
that a seller’s complexity and price choices are positively correlated. In a related exper-
iment Kalayci (2016) uses this setup to study the effect of more competition by varying
the number of sellers. He finds that the number of attributes chosen by sellers does
1There is also a growing body of empirical evidence of inattentive consumer behavior. Such evidence
is documented, for instance, in the context of shipping fees in online auctions (Hossain and Morgan,
2006; Brown et al., 2010), non-posted taxes applied at the register (Chetty et al., 2009) or management fees
of index funds (Choi et al., 2010).
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not vary with the number of sellers and concludes that the intensity of competition has
no effect on obfuscation. In contrast to these papers, we focus on the firm side. More-
over, we also analyze dynamic competition where the same set of participants interact
repeatedly over time.
We share our focus on collusive effects with the study by Crosetto and Gaudeul (2017)
who report an experiment where sellers can choose a price and a price format. They
find that, if rivals’ behavior is observable, firms are able to coordinate on different price
formats which is consistent with tacit collusion on price formats. In our case, we show
that the possibility to shroud leads to higher prices in a setting where sellers repeatedly
interact over time.
In a stylized experiment, where - as in our experiment - the consumer side is comput-
erized Gu and Wenzel (2015) study the effects of different policies (a consumer protec-
tion policy and policies that level the playing field among firms) on firms’ incentives to
strategically obfuscate the market.
Our research is also related to a small number of experimental studies that analyze
spillovers in two-stage games. In most cases, both decisions to be made are cooperation
decisions by nature whereas we analyze the spillovers between a cooperation decision
and a coordination decision. For instance, Suetens (2008) analyzes whether R&D co-
operation facilitates tacit price collusion. She has treatments with and without binding
R&D contracts, and two different levels of spillovers. She finds that the level of tacit col-
lusion in the contract treatments is significantly higher in periods where R&D contracts
are made than in periods without contracts. Prices are also higher than in the baseline
treatments. The differences to our paper are Suetens’ focus on explicit commitment to
R&D and that both decisions are cooperation decisions by nature. Also, a comparison
to a treatment without R&D is not feasible. Cason and Gangadharan (2013) also con-
sider potential spillovers between R&D cooperation and collusive price setting, but in
their experiment they consider a more competitive trading institution (double auction).
Similarly to our paper, they also consider treatments with both decisions in isolation.
They find that the presence of competition reduces the incentive to cooperate. Unlike
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Suetens (2008), they find no evidence that R&D cooperation facilitates collusive price
setting. More recently, Cason et al. (2012) consider spillovers between two coordination
decisions. They study minimum- and median-effort coordination games where partic-
ipants make the two decisions either simultaneously or sequentially. They show that
successful coordination on the Pareto optimal equilibrium in the median effort stage in-
fluences decision making in the minimum effort stage when the two stages are played
sequentially. Their research differs to ours in that we study spillovers between a coor-
dination and a cooperation decision. Our results are also slightly different: we observe
a positive spillover in the cooperation decision (higher prices) and a negative spillover
in the coordination decision (lower shrouding rates).
III A simple model of add-on pricing
Model setup
The model we consider is a stylized version of Gabaix and Laibson (2006).2 Consider
an oligopoly market with n ≥ 2 firms offering a homogeneous product (the base good)
which, for simplicity and without loss of generality, can be produced at zero costs.
There is a unit mass of consumers each demanding one unit of this base good. Firms
set a price of pi ∈ [0, p̄] for the base good.
There is an additional service or add-on product consumers may purchase and firms
can choose to shroud the price of this add-on or its very existence to consumers. Consumers—
who may not be aware of the add-on’s existence—can be exploited by such a shrouding
strategy. In contrast, if firms actively advertise (or unshroud) add-on information, con-
sumers become informed about the presence of the add-on and can take it into account
when making their purchase decision. Initially, all consumers are unaware of the add-
2In our simplified setup, the shrouding and the add-on pricing decision are combined into one single
decision and, depending on firms’ shrouding decision, either all consumers are myopic or sophisticated.
Moreover, as in Heidhues et al. (2017), there is a lower bound on the base good price allowing for positive
profits in equilibrium.
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on, but become educated if at least one firm decides to unshroud.3
Following Gabaix and Laibson (2006), the add-on shrouding decision of the firms is
a coordination decision. If all firms decide to shroud add-on information, (myopic)
consumers can be exploited and be charged high add-on fees. In the following, we refer
to markets where all sellers decide to shrouded as a shrouded market. We assume that,
in this case, firms earn an extra profit of f for each consumer who buys the base good
from this supplier.4 If a firm unshrouds add-on information, this firm earns a lower
extra profit of f < f for each unit of the base good sold. The main insight of Gabaix and
Laibson (2006) is that firms cannot gain additional customers by unshrouding: the act of
unshrouding makes consumers become aware of this practice, but they still will not buy
the add-on from the unshrouding supplier and will rather turn to an outside option.
The unshrouding decision imposes a negative externality on firms still shrouding add-
on information—they do not sell the add-on any more.
We summarize the model as follows. The n firms simultaneously and independently
decide on both the pricing and the shrouding decision. The indicator function 1i in-
dicates whether firm i shrouds. Further, let p = min{p1, p2, ..., pn} denote the smallest










j 1j + f(1− 1i)
m
if pi = p




j 1j is the product across all n shrouding decisions. In words, provided firm
i charges the lowest price, its profits are the price for the base good, plus possibly f
(provided all firms shroud) or f (provided i unshrouds). If firm i does not charge the
3In our model all consumers are, in the terminology of Gabaix and Laibson (2006), either myopic
or sophisticated. In their paper, also situations are considered where both types of consumers coexist.
This simplifying assumption has also been imposed in Heidhues et al. (2017), and is useful to reduce the
complexity of the experiment.
4Note that in Gabaix and Laibson (2006) can freely choose the add-on price, but it is shown that a
shrouding firms always sets the maximal possible price. To simplify the experiment, we directly impose
this price which corresponds to f .
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lowest price, its profits are zero.
Static game
We start by analyzing the one-shot game where firms compete only once. There exist
two equilibria in pure strategies, one in which all firms decide to shroud and one in
which all firms unshroud add-on information:
Proposition 1. i) There exists an equilibrium where all firms shroud add-on information. Each
firm sets a base good price of p∗ = 0 and earns profits of π∗ = f
n
. ii) There exists an equilibrium
where all firms unshroud add-on information. Each firm sets a base good price of p∗ = 0 and




The proof is simple. From (1), firm i’s best reply is to shroud provided
∏
j 6=i 1j = 1
and regardless of p. Any static equilibrium must involve p∗ = 0. Hence, i) is a Nash
equilibrium. If
∏
j 6=i 1j = 0, firm i’s best reply is to unshroud. Hence, ii) is a Nash
equilibrium. In addition, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Coordination games typically exhibit multiple equilibria, and in our model one part
of the game (the shrouding decision) has the properties of the stag-hunt game. There
exist two equilibria in pure strategies—one in which all firms coordinate on shrouding
and one in which all firms coordinate on unshrouding. Both types of equilibrium exist
independent of the number of competing firms.5
In either equilibrium the base good price is driven to zero, the lowest possible price
as we assume they are bounded below by zero. This implies that even though base
goods offered by different firms are homogeneous, firms can earn positive profits in
equilibrium.6 In addition, profits in the shrouding equilibrium are higher than in the
5In this paper we focus on situations where multiple equilibria exist. Indeed, also in the model by
Gabaix and Laibson (2006), multiple equilibria exist when the effects of shrouding are sufficiently large.
6If we allowed for negative prices, all profits from add-on sales would be competed away by subsi-
dized base good prices (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006). In our model, with a lower bound on the base-good
price equal to zero, this is not possible and hence, firms are able to earn positive profits. A lower bound
is also imposed in Heidhues et al. (2017).
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unshrouding equilibrium. That is, from the firms’ perspective it would be beneficial to
coordinate on the shrouding equilibrium.7
Finitely repeated game
We now turn to the analysis of the finitely repeated game. Suppose that the stage game
from above is repeated for T periods. In each period, t = 1, .., T , firms decide on the
price and on whether to shroud add-on information.
Many subgame-perfect equilibria exist in this repeated game. In particular, the shroud-
ing and unshrouding equilibria of the one-shot game are also equilibria in the repeated
game where, in each period, firms play the equilibrium strategies of the one-shot game.
In addition, there are also equilibria where firms play the shrouding equilibrium in
some periods and the unshrouding equilibrium in other periods. In all of these equi-
libria, the price for the base good is zero.
More interestingly, the finitely repeated game also possesses (tacitly) collusive equilib-
ria which are not equilibria of the one-shot game (Benoit and Krishna, 1985; Friedman,
1985).8 The reason is that the one-shot game has multiple equilibria. We will show
that, in our case, there exist equilibria where firms raise the base good price above the
competitive level of p = 0 (at least for some periods) if the time horizon of the game
is sufficiently long. There exist equilibria in which firms charge the monopoly price
for the base good, p, over many periods because the unshrouding equilibrium (with
lower profits than in the shrouding equilibrium) can be used as a credible punishment
strategy if a firm deviates from collusion.
We construct collusive equilibria where firms collude on a base good price pc > 0 in the
first periods of the game and then return to the competitive price of p = 0 toward the
end of the game. As in Friedman (1985), we consider trigger strategies: if firms behave
7Note that in Gabaix and Laibson (2006) profits in both shrouding and unshrouding equilibria are
identical. In the case of a perfectly competitive industry, firm profits are equal zero in both types of
equilibrium. That is, the conditions for shrouding to occur are more favorable in our setup than in theirs.
8Harrington (1987) shows for multiproduct oligopoly that defection from the cooperative outcome
can be prevented by threatening the defector with being forced to exit the industry.
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according to the collusive equilibrium, they will coordinate on shrouding. As soon
as a deviation by any firm is observed, they switch to unshrouding for the remaining
periods. Specifically, suppose that in period t, H+1 periods remain to be played (period
t plus H further periods). We want firms to cooperate on a price pc > 0 and to shroud
in period t, and to charge pc = 0 and to shroud in the final H periods. If some firm j
deviates by setting pj < p
c in period t, the trigger strategy calls for unshrouding in the
final H periods.
When does this trigger strategy constitute an subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? Stick-
ing to the tacitly collusive agreement, firm i earns a profit of (p
c+f)
n
in period t and a
profit of f
n
in each of the following periods. Total profits from cooperating in period





. Suppose now firm i deviates from collusion in period t. The
optimal deviation is to marginally undercut the collusive price pc in order to obtain the
whole market and to keep shrouding in t. Profits in this period are (pc + f). After the
deviation has occurred, the unshrouding will be triggered for the remaining periods,
leading to profits of
f
n
in each of these periods. Total profits from deviating are then




Adhering to the trigger strategy is better than deviating if and only if
H ≥ H∗(pc) = ⌈
(pc + f)(N − 1)
f − f
⌉ (2)
where ⌈x⌉ denotes as the smallest integer not less than x. The threshold H∗(pc) is the
critical number of remaining periods (after t) such that firms stick to the collusive agree-
ment in period t.
How does this logic extend to the periods before t? Obviously, firms will not only stick
to the collusive agreement in the period immediately preceding H∗(pc) but will also
adhere to this agreement in all prior periods. In fact, the incentive to stick to collusion
is stronger with a larger number of periods (and therefore equilibria with prices that
decline over time toward period T are possible). It follows that a collusive equilibrium
exists if the number of periods of the game, T , is at least H∗(pc) + 1. The following
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Proposition summarizes our analysis:
Proposition 2. Provided T ≥ H∗(pc) + 1, there exists an subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
where firms tacitly collude on a price pc > 0 from periods t = 1, ..., T −H∗(pc).
The Proposition is specified for arbitrary collusive prices pc > 0, including p̄. In equi-
librium, firms shroud the add-on in all periods; they charge a collusive price in t =
1, ..., T −H∗(pc) and the competitive price in t = T −H∗(pc) + 1, ..., T .
Note that the higher the collusive price, the longer the time horizon needed to sustain
collusion. This follows immediately as H∗(pc) is strictly increasing in pc. Indeed, this
might give rise to more elaborate (tacitly) collusive agreements where firms succes-
sively reduce the collusive price toward the end of the game, allowing them to collude
for a longer period of time.
IV Experimental design
Our main goal is to analyze the impact of increased competition on the shrouding of
markets. We therefore ran sessions with two and four sellers playing a game resembling
the one in our theory section. We ran sessions with both random and fixed matching
schemes. The random-matching procedure corresponds to the one-shot game, which is
the assumption underlying Gabaix and Laibson (2006). The fixed matching procedure
mimics the nature of the finitely repeated game, as outlined above. In all treatments,
participants take the role of sellers while buyer behavior is simulated by the computer.
In each round of the experiment, sellers simultaneously had to make two decisions.
Sellers had to decide on the base good price, which had to be an integer in [0,10], and
whether or not to shroud the add-on. Buyers are computer simulated and would buy
from the seller offering the lowest price. In the case of a tie, each seller receives the same
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share of buyers.9
Parameters regarding shrouding were f = 5 and f = 10. In the case a seller decides to
unshroud the seller earns an extra amount of f = 5 for each unit of the base good sold.
In the case of shrouding a seller receives an extra amount of f = 10 for each unit sold
if the market is shrouded, that is, if also all other sellers decide to shroud. Otherwise,
if at least one seller decides to unshroud, a shrouding seller would receive no extra
revenues. The total payoff to a seller is then calculated by multiplying the number of
sold units with the chosen price plus the extra revenues from add-on sales (as described
above). A seller not charging the lowest price receives zero payoff.
It should be noted that while the pricing decision was framed, the shrouding decision
was not and we used a neutral description. Participants of the experiment were told
that they could earn extra profits by deciding between two actions, A and B where
action A corresponded to unshrouding and action B to shrouding. We decided to use a
neutral frame because any description along the lines “you may hide this information
from buyers” may have biased seller participants against shrouding.
At the end of each round, sellers were informed of the price choices and shrouding
decisions by all sellers. In addition, they received information on the profits earned in
this round. The experiment was repeated for 15 rounds.
To analyze behavioral spillovers between the decisions, we ran two extra treatments
where the shrouding and the pricing decisions were played in isolation. The first con-
trol treatment involved the shrouding decision only, the second additional treatment
involved the pricing decision only. In treatment “shrouding only”, there was no price
competition, so we implicitly set both prices equal to zero when determining the payoffs
for this game. Essentially, subjects were playing a simple 2×2 stag-hunt game with (60,
60), (30, 30), (30, 0) and (0, 30) as payoffs. These payoffs roughly correspond to the aver-
age payoffs made in the “price and shroud” treatment. The second decision (price) was
9We decided not to add further complexity to the experiment by adding subjects acting as buyers.
Indeed, Jin et al. (2015) find evidence that receivers are often naive about non-disclosed information
while reacting nearly optimally when information is disclosed which can be viewed as support for our
assumptions on computerized buyer behavior.
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Treatment # sellers matching decisions # participants # groups
1 two random shroud and price 48 6
2 four random shroud and price 48 4
3 two fixed shroud and price 22 11
4 four fixed shroud and price 20 5
5 two fixed shroud only 22 11
6 two fixed price only 22 11
Table 1: Treatments
not mentioned. In the “price only” treatment, firms’ profit per unit included a base pay-
ment of 10 which corresponds to the payoff from shrouding in the “price and shroud”
treatments, although no mention of the second (shrouding) decision was made. Both
extra treatments were done with fixed-matching duopolies.
We can use the additional treatments to detect possible interactions between decisions,
that is, whether the presence of one decision (say, shrouding) has an impact on the
behavior of the second decision (price competition). Those treatments were done with
n = 2 and with a fixed matching scheme. Table 1 summarizes the treatments.
All sessions were conducted at the experimental economics laboratory University of
Duesseldorf. The experiment was implemented using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Sessions lasted for about 45 minutes. The appendix contains an English transla-
tion of the instructions.
Subjects received a show-up of 4 EUR and could earn additional amounts during the
experiment. On average, participants received an amount of 8.38 EUR. In total, 182
subjects participated in our experiment. Subjects came from all departments (with 25%
from Economics and Business studies), and 50% were female. The average age of a
participant was 24.6 years. No subject participated in more than one session and none
of the subjects had ever participated in any similar experiment before.
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V Hypotheses
The theory section has established a multiplicity of equilibria and how these may effect
tacit collusion in the repeated game. Our theory section does, however, not directly sug-
gest any hypotheses as to how our treatment variants will affect the decision to shroud.
We therefore refer to equilibrium-selection criteria and existing experimental evidence
in most of this section.
Our first hypothesis is about the shrouding frequency of n = 2 vs. n = 4 firms in the
treatments with random matching. Intuitively, the larger the number of players, the less
likely players will coordinate on the payoff dominant shrouding equilibrium. After all,
one unshrouding decision in the market already implies a payoff of zero for the firms
that shroud, so shrouding gets more risky with a larger n. Carlsson and van Damme
(1993) show that, for n > 2 players, the predictions of various equilibrium-selection
criteria differ, but many criteria including the Selten-Harsanyi tracing procedure and
global games predict that the unshrouding outcome is the risk dominant equilibrium
for a larger n and indeed in our case for n = 4. See also Kim (1996). Thus we have:
Hypothesis 1. With random matching, players decide to shroud more often in duopolies than
in quadropolies.
Regarding the same question with fixed matching, existing experiments where the same
participants interact repeatedly over time suggest a negative correlation of coordina-
tion on the payoff dominant equilibrium and number of players. We refer here to the
minimum-effort game which is essentially a generalization of the stag-hunt game to
more than two actions (typically seven). See van Huyck et al. (1990) for details and
Engelmann and Normann (2010) for a meta study.10 We propose:
Hypothesis 2. With fixed matching, players decide to shroud more often in duopolies than in
quadropolies.
10For stag hunt experiments, see for example, Battalio et al. (2001), Clark and Sefton (2001) or Schmidt
et al. (2003). In those experiments, the coordination action was the only decision while in our main setup
participants simultaneously decide whether to shroud and on a price.
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A third hypothesis regards the frequency of shrouding decisions in fixed vs. random
matching. For instance, Clark and Sefton (2001) observe that in stag-hunt coordina-
tion experiments participants tend to choose the more risky strategy (corresponding
to shrouding in our case) significantly more often with a repeated matching protocol
than with a random matching protocol. In addition, coordination failure is less often
observed. We thus hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3. Markets are shrouded more often with fixed matching than with random match-
ing.
Our analysis of the finitely repeated game suggests that unshrouding may occur as a
punishment for (off equilibrium) deviations in the price dimensions. We will compare
data from fixed-matching duopolies to those where subjects play the stag-hunt game
only. The aforementioned results in minimum-effort games suggest that virtually all
two-player groups (87.5 %) coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium (see Engel-
mann and Normann, 2010). This coordination success in the stag-hunt only treatment
should thus be higher than in the price-plus-stag-hunt treatment:
Hypothesis 4. With fixed matching, there is more shrouding in the treatment which involves
only the shrouding decision than in the treatment which involves both the pricing and the shroud-
ing decisions.
The repeated game gives rise to the existence of tacitly collusive equilibria with above
marginal cost pricing. For our experimental design, Proposition 2 predicts, for example,
that duopolies and quadropolies can (tacitly) collude on the maximum price of 10 for
the first 11 or 3 periods, respectively. Supra competitive pricing is theoretically not
feasible in the treatment where the shrouding decision is absent. We thus obtain our
final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. With fixed matching, markets that involve the pricing decision only will exhibit
lower prices than our shrouding-plus-price-setting markets.
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Treatment number of matching decisions shrouding shrouded selling
sellers rate markets price
1 two random shroud and price 0.73 0.56 2.48
2 four random shroud and price 0.15 0.0 0.14
3 two fixed shroud and price 0.73 0.62 4.36
4 four fixed shroud and price 0.29 0.07 0.79
5 two fixed shroud only 1.00 1.00 –
6 two fixed price only – – 1.46
Table 2: Main results
VI Results
We start by describing the results with random matching before proceeding with the re-
sults from the treatments with fixed matching. Finally, we evaluate the spillover effects
between the pricing and the shrouding decisions.
All tests are based on data from all periods. We employ non-parametric tests, where the
number of independent observations corresponds to the number of matching groups.
We report two-sided p-values throughout.
For an overview, Table 2 contains our main findings, comprising the average shrouding
rate, the share of shrouded markets as well as the average selling price in each treatment.
Further evidence is contained in Figures 5 and 6 in the appendix which shows how the
main variables evolve over time.
Random matching
Under the random matching protocol (mimicking one-shot interactions), shrouding
rates and shrouded markets are significantly lower with four than with two firms (Mann-
Whitney rank-sum test, p = 0.011 and p = 0.010, respectively). The rejection of the null
hypothesis is statistical support for our Hypothesis 1.
Table 2 provides the shrouding rates and the share of shrouded markets in the treat-














































(b) The evolution of selling prices
Figure 1: The evolution of shrouding rates and selling prices with random matching
evolve over time. We can see that high shrouding rates and shrouded markets are preva-
lent in duopoly markets (73% shrouding rate and 56% shrouded markets).11 We can also
see that shrouding rates are stable over time. In contrast, shrouding with four sellers
is relatively rare. We observe shrouding in only 15% of all observations. In addition,
shrouding rates decrease over time and are close to zero in the final periods. Shrouded
markets, that is, coordination success with all four sellers choosing to shroud is almost
never observed.
Regarding selling prices (that is, winning bids) we observe the expected result that
prices tend to be higher with fewer firms (Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, p = 0.011). In
all periods, prices are higher with two sellers, however, as the right panel of Figure 1
shows, selling prices decline over time. The selling price with four sellers rapidly con-
verges toward zero while the selling price with two sellers remains positive even in the
final periods. This is consistent with the findings in the previous literature (Dufwen-
berg and Gneezy, 2000).
We summarize our results with random matching as follows:
Result 1. Shrouding with random matching. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, there is a
substantial amount of shrouding in the duopoly markets which does not decline over time, and
11Note that the observed shrouding rate is less than 100% but above the symmetric mixed-strategy















































(b) The evolution of selling prices
Figure 2: The evolution of shrouding rates and selling prices with fixed matching
there is little shrouding in the n = 4 markets which, moreover, converges to zero.
Fixed matching
We now turn to the results in the treatment with fixed matching where the same sellers
(two or four) repeatedly interact over the entire length of the experiment. Table 2 pro-
vides overall shrouding rates and the left panel of Figure 2 shows the evolution over
time.
As in the treatments with random matching and consistent with Hypothesis 2, we ob-
serve that shrouding is more prevalent in markets with fewer sellers (Mann-Whitney
rank-sum test, p = 0.015). There is substantial shrouding with two sellers, which, how-
ever, decreases over time, but is still significant at the end of the experiment. Coordi-
nation success on shrouding is also high. As in the treatment with random matching,
with four sellers, shrouding rates and coordination success is much lower.12
The right panel of Figure 2 displays selling prices over time. We observe that prices
are higher with two than with four sellers (Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, p = 0.002).
With two sellers, prices are above the static Nash equilibrium prediction of zero, but de-
12Note that in periods 6 - 10 we observe a transitory increase in the shrouding rates which is driven by
two groups. However, shrouding was never successful and by period 11 all firms in these two groups
have returned to unshrouding. We interpret this as an (unsuccessful) attempt to initiate cooperation.
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crease over time, in particular, in the final periods of the experiment. That is, prices are
somewhat collusive with two sellers. With four sellers, selling prices are close to zero
from period 5 on and, hence, sellers are not able to sustain (tacitly) collusive prices. This
numbers effect is consistent with previous findings which find that tacit collusion is un-
likely in markets with more than two sellers (Huck et al., 2004; Fonseca and Normann,
2012).
Summarizing our findings:
Result 2. Shrouding with fixed matching. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, there is a sub-
stantial amount of shrouding in the duopoly markets which does, however, decline over time.
With n = 4 firms, only one market is shrouded toward the end.
The impact of the matching procedure
An interesting result is that coordination on the shrouding equilibrium does not im-
prove much with fixed matching. For n = 2, we note that there is not more shrouding
with fixed matching than with random matching - which seems surprising. From Hy-
pothesis 3, we expect more shrouding (that is, better coordination) with fixed matching.
However, the shrouding rates with fixed and random matching are not statistically dif-
ferent for n = 2 (Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, p = 0.513).13 For n = 4, we do observe
better coordination success on shrouding with fixed matching, however, the effect is
weak overall. Since we cannot reject the null hypothesis (Mann-Whitney rank-sum test,
p = 0.459), we find no support for Hypothesis 3. This result suggests that the shrouding
mechanism is possibly used by players in a different manner with fixed matching, at
least for the duopolies. We explore this issue in the next subsection in more detail.
Result 3. Impact of matching scheme on shrouding behavior. We find virtually no
support for Hypothesis 3. With fixed matching we do not observe more shrouding than with
13We note that with two sellers prices are higher with fixed matching than with random matching
(Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, p = 0.035). However, due to endgame effects this difference becomes






































(b) Comparison to pricing decision in isolation
Figure 3: Spillovers between coordination and cooperation decision
random matching.
Spillovers between decisions
Our previous results suggest that spillovers exist between the pricing and the shrouding
decision, for instance, because participants might use shrouding (unshrouding) as a
reward (threat) for sticking to (deviating from) collusive prices. To shed light on the
spillovers, we now compare the n = 2 treatment with fixed matching to treatments
where
i) players play the shrouding decision only,
ii) players play the pricing decision only.
Figure 3 provides the results from those two treatments. The left panel of the figure
shows that shrouding is significantly more frequent in the treatment where the shroud-
ing decision is played in isolation (Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, p < 0.001). Indeed,
we observe that participants always choose to shroud. This is consistent with our find-
ing that, with fixed matching, when both decisions are played simultaneously players
punish deviation by unshrouding.
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Result 4. Less shrouding due to spillovers between decisions. Consistent with Hy-
pothesis 4, shrouding is significantly more frequent in the treatment where subjects play the
shrouding decision only.
The right panel of Figure 3 reports the results of the pricing decision played in isola-
tion. It shows that the average selling price is significantly higher in the treatment with
both pricing and shrouding decision compared to the pricing decision only, suggest-
ing tacit collusion on prices is supported by shrouding (Mann-Whitney rank-sum test,
p = 0.005), as conjectured in Hypothesis 5.
Thus, we conclude:
Result 5. Shrouding opportunities facilitate tacit collusion. Consistent with Hypothesis
5, the opportunity to shroud/unshroud leads to higher prices than the comparable game without
such opportunities.
This is in line with the observation that shrouding rates and selling prices are corre-
lated within groups for the duopolies with fixed matching. Out of eleven groups in the
duopolies with fixed matching, eight have a positive Spearman correlation of (selling)
prices and shrouding rates, two groups show no correlation at all, and only one group
exhibits a negative correlation. We conclude that prices and shrouding decisions are
significantly positively correlated (sign test, p = 0.039). Beyond that, we also find that
average prices and shrouding rates are correlated across groups. Figure 4 plots the cor-
relation between the share of shrouded markets and selling prices at the group level.
























Share of shrouded markets
Figure 4: Correlation between shrouded markets and selling prices
VII Conclusion
In a seminal paper, Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show that obfuscation strategies theoret-
ically survive even under perfect competition. Due to a “curse of debiasing”, compet-
itive firms will find that informing consumers about their competitors’ shrouding and
overcharging policy will not be profitable. Similar findings have also been obtained in
Armstrong and Vickers (2012) and Heidhues et al. (2017).
Our experiment supports the hypothesis of Gabaix and Laibson (2006) in that markets
are indeed often and substantially shrouded even with competitive (one-shot) interac-
tions, but they also suggest two channels through which tougher competition has an
effect. First, shrouding and unshrouding equilibria coexist. The shrouding decision re-
sembles a coordination decision with shrouding being the more profitable but also the
riskier strategy. With a larger number of players (four as opposed to two, in our case),
unshrouding becomes prevalent, so more competition is detrimental to shrouding. The
second effect of intensified competition on shrouding occurs with repeated interactions.
For concentrated markets (duopolies in our case), our model argues that shrouding op-
portunities facilitate tacit collusion: prices are higher than in a comparable game with-
out the shrouding/unshrouding decision. The reason is that unshrouding can serve
as a credible threat to sustain cooperation. Even though unshrouding—possibly as a
punishment—is sometimes carried out, an anti-competitive effect occurs in terms of
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higher base good prices. In less concentrated markets, prices above marginal cost do
not occur anyhow (Huck et al., 2004) so more competition curbs the effect of shrouding
in this case, too.
There are examples where shrouding exists in markets with many competitors, and
they appear to establish counter examples to our hypothesis that increased competition
is detrimental to shrouding. In the market for pre-dial call-by-call landline telephony,
there are often a lot of companies offering even more tariffs. Buyers are easily confused
as there many price dimensions, some of which are indeed shrouded (call destination,
time, duration, method of payment, registration, local availability, etc.). In our view,
the problem in such markets is not that competition has no effect but that tougher com-
petition forces firms to invent more price or product attributes they can shroud (see
Spiegler (2006) who models this situation). Given an industry is stuck with one or a
few possible shrouding opportunities, we expect competition to have an effect.
The implications for competition policy are as follows. At least in markets with multiple
equilibria, a larger number of competitors has the desirable potential of eradicating
non-desirable obfuscation strategies. In markets with imperfect competition, however,
not only do obfuscation strategies survive, but in addition, our experiments suggest
that shrouding opportunities facilitate tacit collusion, that is, they cause higher base
good prices. Hence, whereas the scope for shrouding may be limited by competitive


























































Figure 6: The evolution of shrouding rates in all treatments
Instructions
Here we provide a translation of the instructions. The original instructions are in Ger-
man. We provide the instructions for the treatment with two sellers and fixed matching:
24
Welcome to this experiment in decision making. Please read the instructions carefully.
During the experiment you can earn points depending on your own decisions and those
of the other participants. At the end of the experiment these points are converted at a
rate of 200 points = 1 EUR into Euro and paid to you.
You are starting with an amount of 800 points. This amount is increased by the earnings
in each period.
The setup
In this experiment you are assigned the role of a seller. There are two sellers in a market.
At the start of the experiment participants are assigned into groups of two sellers. This
assignment is the same in all rounds of the experiment, that is, in each round you are
interacting with the same participant.
You and the other seller are selling a good on this market. Buyers decide from which
seller to purchase the good. There are 12 buyers and each buyer purchases exactly one
unit of the good. The buyers are simulated by the computer.
In each round both sellers simultaneously choose a price. The chosen price must be an
integer between 0 and 10. The computerized buyers are programmed to buy from the
seller who has chosen the lower price. The seller who has chosen the higher price does
not sell at all. In the case of a tie, each seller receives half of the buyers.
In addition, in each round, the sellers decide between two actions, A and B:
• If you choose action A, you receive an additional income of 5 points for each unit
sold.
• If you choose action B, the additional points you can earn depend on the decision
by the other seller. If the other seller also chooses action B, you receive 10 extra
points for each unit sold. If the other seller chooses action A, you receive no extra
points.
End of each period
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At the end of each period, the computer calculates how many units you and the other
seller have sold. Finally, you receive information about the points that you have earned
this period:
Your points = (price x quantity sold) + (extra earning x quantity sold)
End of the experiment
The experiment is repeated for 15 rounds. As already stated above, in each round you
will interact with the same participant. At the end of the experiment your earnings will
be paid out to you. Your earnings comprise the show-up fee and the points you have
earned during the experiment.
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